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Abstract 
The Conservative Party in Wales has undergone a great deal of change since the 
creation of the National Assembly in 1999. As a party that vociferously opposed the 
passing of any devolution settlement,1 the ‘Yes’ outcome of the devolution 
referendum would push the party into a crisis of relevancy. How exactly does a 
conservative deal such changes in the structure of a political system? What are the 
environmental push-pull factors and themes that emanate from such a change?2 This 
dissertation seeks to explore such questions and also communicates the experiences 
of the Welsh Conservative party in the age of devolution. 
 
The structure of this dissertation is chronological in nature.3 It begins with the 
experiences of the Conservatives in the first assembly onwards to the present at the 
time of writing (2010). A myriad of materials will be utilised from the works of 
Conservative philosophers, specialists in devolution specifically of the Welsh form4, 




                                                          
1
 John Major,  You can only be sure with the Conservatives,  Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 1997, 
P. 1 
2
 These themes include party leadership, the relationship between the Welsh and National party and the 
philosophy of conservatism as applied to institutional change amongst others. 
 
4
 Especially through the findings of the devolution monitoring reports. 
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“The Government are unwilling to rule out the possibility of future transfers of ministerial 
functions to the assembly. At the moment, the Government have no plans to make further 
orders. I have repeatedly stressed that devolution is a process, not an event.”5 
Defining devolution as a process and not an event is quite likely to be the most 
famous and widely-quoted comment on devolution in the United Kingdom. Whilst 
the statement and the immediate thoughts of it are brought towards the process of 
the devolution of a political system, it is also important to note that a different form 
of devolution is occurring outside of the structures of government.  The political 
parties those organisations that compete for the power to control the machine of 
government had to adjust themselves in order to grasp a modified and restructured 
political machine. Thus a process of devolution for the political parties of the United 
Kingdom that competed in those newly-devolved polities would begin in tandem 
with the devolution of the political structures of the British state. 
 
The Conservative and previously, Tory party in Wales has historically been the 
recipient of unpopular sentiment and scorn amongst the majority of the people of 
Wales since the mid-nineteenth century6 . Ever since the expansion of the electoral 
franchise, and the creation of a Welsh arm in 19217, the party has consistently failed 
                                                          
5
 Ron Davies MP, Commons Hansard, 21
st
 January 1998: Column 1108 
6
 John Davies,  A History of Wales, Revised edition, 2007 p. 370 
7
 Beti Jones, Welsh Elections 1885 – 1997, Lolfa, 1998 
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to capture the support of the majority of people in the region.8 This unpopularity 
existed for a number of reasons. Firstly, the party was traditionally supportive of the 
landed class of people9, a great proportion of which in Wales were either of English 
descent or the descendants of ancient Norman Lords.10 Secondly, the party was 
associated with the Anglican church of England, a church with its traditions of 
theological conformism that ran counter to the traditionally nonconformist Baptist 
and Methodist communities of Wales.11 Thirdly, the proportion and relative 
popularity in anglicised and thus the English-speaking regions of Wales further 
alienated the party from the majority of Welsh people outside of those regions12. In 
all accounts the party was perceived as an alien force (and some argue a force of 
English imperialism)13 which threatened the very existence of Wales as an idea and 
the Welsh culture and language that enforced a sense of identity different to that of 
England. Before the formation of the Labour Party, the Liberal Party garnered the 
great mass of electoral support in Wales14. After the formation of the Labour Party in 
1900, this dominant position was taken up by that party. The popularity of classical 
liberalism and later socialism in Wales has indicated that historically the electorate 
of Wales has rejected the Conservative party and before that the Tory Party at a 
consistently substantial level.15 
                                                          
8
 David Melding, Have We Been Anti-Welsh? The Conservative Party and the Welsh Nation, 2005 
9








 Adam Price MP,  Wales: The First and Final Colony, Lecture to the Institute of Welsh Politics, Aberystwyth 
University, 16th November 2009 
14
 John Davies,  A History of Wales, Revised edition, 2007 p.286 
15
 Wyn Jones, Scully & Trystan, Why do the Conservatives do (even) worse in Wales?, British Parties and 
Elections Review, 2002 
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As the Conservative and Unionist Party, one of the fundamental tenets of the 
parties’ ideology was a strict adherence to British Unionism which continues to this 
day with party leader David Cameron claiming that the party will "do everything and 
anything to keep our two countries as one."16  Localisation and regionalism in the 
Kingdom were thus strongly opposed as catalysts of disunity. In contrast, policies 
that would help cement and bind the cultural divisions of the people of the Isle of 
Britain were supported. Thus, Welsh culture, the language and the self-
determination of a Welsh nation were also to be strictly opposed and were 
historically expressed through educational reform and recommendations that 
advanced Anglicisation17. A loathing of the party amongst those interested in 
preserving and maintaining Welsh culture and identity would understandably 
develop. In terms of academia this lack of success in Wales has also afforded the 
party far less interest from academics in comparison to the more successful Labour 
and Liberal parties and the interesting regional intricacies and dynamics of Plaid 
Cymru. Therefore this work is an exercise in bringing a greater degree of insight into 
the Conservative Party in Wales and its members during devolution through the 
assembling of the information of that experience together in one singular work. 
 
With the onset of devolution and the creation of the National Assembly of Wales, 
the party would face new challenges within a territory ever more hostile to it. The 
                                                          
16
 Graeme Wilson, ‘Tories Head to Scotland to Defend Union’, The Daily Telegraph, 16
th
 January 2007 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1539649/Tories-head-to-Scotland-to-defend-Union.html 
17
 Commissioners of Inquiry into the State of Education in Wales, Reports of the Commissioners of Inquiry into 
the State of Education in Wales, 1848 
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nature of this dissertation will uncover the history of the Conservative Party in Wales 
during devolution. This exploration will be assessed through a chronological manner 
from the onset of devolution in 1997 up to the twilight of the third Assembly in 
2010. The study of the Conservatives time in the Assembly will be portioned into 
singular chapters for the first, second and third Assemblies. Also, a fourth chapter 
will act as a concluding portion and touch upon the challenges facing the 
Conservative Party in Wales in the future. 
In this examination of the history of the Conservative Party during Devolution, there 
will be a number of running themes. Firstly the relationship between the central 
party in London and the power dynamic between the two will become clear through 
the work. Secondly, the role of individuals and their own influences upon the 
experiences of the Conservative Party in the Assembly will be assessed throughout 
and thirdly the structures of the Conservative Party in Wales and the development of 
a truly devolved and necessarily independent Welsh Conservative Party over the 
course of the devolution process. Whilst explaining the pressures and challenges 
faced by the party during devolution, the work will also argue that devolution of the 
party itself was necessary for it to maintain relevancy within the new political 
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Chapter 1 
1999: A New Beginning: The Conservatives in the First Assembly 
The devolution referendum of 1997 proved to be one of the closest ever undertaken. The 
slight margin of 0.6%18 or, in terms of individuals 672119, represented a majority in favour 
that was slightly higher than the population of Tenby.20 The Conservative Party, long a 
consistent and extreme opponent of devolution and the principal organisation that 
campaigned for a ‘No’ vote was marginally defeated in its efforts. The event in itself 
changed the shape and form of politics in the United Kingdom and even more in Wales, 
which would have a political institution that had power beyond the basic tenets of 
administrative devolution that the Welsh Office in London represented. This is not to say 
however that the party and its members had limited thoughts and debate on devolution. 
Whilst it would be preferable and simpler to paint the Conservative Party of the time as 
heavily-controlled and staunchly old unionist, this simplistic image of it is simply untrue. The 
first substantial conservative argument against devolution, beyond the generalities of the 
unionist argument would be brought into the fore by the then party leader William Hague. 
The question of asymmetric devolution was the main concern of the conservative attack 
upon Labour’s plans for devolution. What this meant was that a devolved Scottish 
Parliament would receive greater legislative and tax-raising powers than would be enjoyed 
by an Assembly in Cardiff. 
 
                                                          
18




 Office for National Statistics, 2001 National Census, found at 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/access_results.asp 
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As Hague wrote in the Western Mail: 
“You are not being offered the same sort of deal that the government gave Scotland: the 
Cardiff Assembly would merely take over the existing responsibilities of the Welsh Office and 
have neither law-making nor tax-raising powers. 
Why do they want to give the Edinburgh Parliament the powers to legislate, but not the 
Cardiff Assembly? Why do they trust Scots to decide whether they want tax-raising powers, 
but not the Welsh? A Welsh Assembly would represent the worst of both worlds. Wales 
would be deprived of its own influence in the UK without gaining a direct say over its own 
affairs.”21 
It should be noted that Hague himself was one of the staunchest opponents of devolution. 
Indeed the intellectual honesty of the debate may be put into question and the nature of it 
as merely a means of attacking Labour Party policy for a wider electoral effect. Regardless of 
the motivations for such a debate, it shows that the conservative party were capable of 
imagining a devolved United Kingdom within the Labour Party model and discussing and 
debating such a model before a referendum had been cast.  
A major theme for the Conservative Party in Wales during this period would be the angst of 
remaining politically relevant. To remain a relevant and thus a living political force in Wales 
the party had to work within the new devolved landscape and seek a way of advancing its 
goals through it. Whilst this is clear to the researcher in hindsight, it was not particularly 
clear to members of the party during the period, particularly those of a staunchly unionist 
persuasion.  
                                                          
21
 Western Mail, 29
th
 January 1997 
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The Philosophy of Conservatism as Applied to the National Assembly 
The formation of the National Assembly of Wales was a major event in terms of changing 
the structure of the British Political system. How a Conservative deals with such a change is 
a difficult question. This is especially difficult since devolution was so consistently opposed 
by the party in terms of both official policy and the views of the great majority of its 
members and supporters as expressed by the party backing the ‘No’ campaign. The British 
conservative philosopher Michael Oakeschott considers the following: 
“Changes then have to be suffered, and a man of Conservative temperament (that is, one 
strongly disposed to preserve his identity) cannot be indifferent to them. In the main, he 
judges them by the disturbance they entail and, like everyone else, deploys his resources to 
meet them. The idea of innovation, on the other hand, is improvement. Nevertheless, a man 
of this temperament will not himself be an ardent innovator, he is not inclined to think that 
nothing is happening unless great changes are afoot and therefore he is not worried by the 
absence of innovation.”22 
In the case of devolution, great change was indeed afoot and a great deal of innovation was 
required on the part of the Conservative party in Wales to maintain its own relevancy and 
remain at least a somewhat notable political force in Wales. The Welsh arm of the party 
would thus require strong and visionary leadership that would unite the party in the 
Assembly and also have the intellectual and political bravery to explore new and alternative 
forms of political engagement. 
                                                          
22
 Michael Oakeschott, ‘On Being Conservative’, in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (new and expanded 
edn, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1991), pp. 407-37, at pp. 410-11 
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As we shall find, another key to the future maintenance of the Conservative party in Wales 
would come from the mind of the Welsh groups intellectual David Melding. Melding would 
from the very beginning of devolution be prepared to work both with devolution and 
develop it further. The main element within the Conservative Party that stood against such 
action would be the desire to maintain the British Union. This desire, to maintain the 
established order of things in light of great change is consistent with traditional 
Conservative positions on change.23 Conservatism is fundamentally a sceptical political 
philosophy. It is largely concerned with what ‘is’ rather than what ‘ought’24 to be and takes 
upon itself a posteriori and thus empirical approach when dealing with new ideas and 
change. Roger Scruton argues that Conservatism isn’t merely the automatic desire to 
conserve the current social order for its own sake: 
“It is a limp definition of conservatism to describe it as the desire to conserve; for although 
there is in every man and woman some impulse to conserve that which is safe and familiar, it 
is the nature of this ‘familiarity’ that needs to be examined. To put it briefly, conservatism 
arises directly from the sense that one belongs to some continuing, and pre-existing social 
order, and that this fact is all-important in determining what to do. … The desire to conserve 
is compatible with all manner of change, provided only that change is also continuity.”25 
This highlights an important disparity between conservatives on the issue of devolution. 
Those who would view devolution as a first step towards the end of the British union would 
view it as a natural enemy. Others, as we shall see would view it not as a threat, but as an 
opportunity to renew the union in the spirit of progressive continuity. 
                                                          
23
 Edmund Burke,  Reflections of the Revolution in France, 1790 
24
 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 1739 
25
 Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (3
rd
 edn, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001) pp. 10-11 
P a g e  | 11 
 
The Starting Field 
Gifted with just nine AM’s during the 1999 Welsh Assembly election26, it was clear that this 
Conservative Party would not enjoy a clear position as either the number-one or two party 
within the polity as it did in Westminster. Interestingly, eight of the nine AM’s were regional 
candidates elected through the additional member system27. In essence the conservatives 
benefitted from an electoral system that the party had strongly opposed for decades. Thus 
policy interests for the Welsh party and those of the central party in Westminster were not 
congruent on this issue. It would be clear that to survive the Welsh party had to develop 
new and different strategies than those exercised by the party in Westminster in order for it 
to survive on the political terrain of the Assembly. 
 
A New Party in Wales and a New Leader 
Now that a new polity existed in Wales, to compete within that system a new Welsh arm of 
the party was required with all of the kinds of organisational structures and hierarchies that 
the party in Westminster operated. First and foremost the question of who would head that 
hierarchy and thus the party in Wales would be brought to the fore. Since the party could be 
roughly delineated between the more extreme unionists and moderates, the two main 
candidates for leadership would fall into those two categories. The staunchly unionist Rod 
Richards would become a favourite amongst those that wished to repeal devolution whilst 
the more moderate Nick Bourne would be favoured by those already seeking to work with 
                                                          
26
 Bryn Morgan, Welsh Assembly Elections: May 1999 Research Paper, House of Commons Library, p. 6 
Found at: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-051.pdf 
27
 Ibid. 
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devolution for pragmatic reasons. The leadership contest would be decided by a ballot of 
Welsh members of the Conservative Party. In this contest Richards would be the victor and 
became the first leader of the Welsh Conservatives in the Assembly. This outcome indicates 
the views of Conservative Party membership in Wales during this period. That is that the 
membership preferred a staunch unionist compared with the moderating influence of Nick 
Bourne. At this point it is clear that party membership were extremely opposed to the very 
existence of a devolved assembly. In hindsight one would question the ability of the 
Conservative Party in Wales to remain relevant in the assembly with the leadership of an 
ultra-unionist. However, as the influential Italian philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli 
observed28, fortuna is the enemy of political order. The ascendancy of Richards to party 
leader would be affected by three particular events, all unrelated. The first issue for 
Richards would be the structure and the manner of his selection to the Assembly. Richards, 
as a favourite in the party would be selected as both a constituency candidate for Clwyd 
West and a regional candidate on the party list for North Wales West. Richards would not 
win the constituency seat but would gain admittance through his position as head of the 
party list in the region. Thus, the legitimacy of dual-candidacy and Richards’ position within 
the Assembly would be put under strain by this fact. It is argued that dual-candidacy retracts 
from legitimacy since the electors have explicitly decided to not reward the individual in 
question with a seat whilst the political party have decided to place him.29 Therefore 
political power is moved by a degree into the hands of the party hierarchy and not the 
voters.30  The second event and perhaps the most serious and damaging was the accusation 
                                                          
28
 Nicollò Machiavelli, The Prince , 1532 – This treatise would become the basis for political intrigue from the 
renaissance onwards until the present day.  
29
 Lord Ivor Richard et al., Report of the Richard Commission, Spring 2004, p. 233  
30
 Ibid. 
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that Richards committed grievous bodily harm against a young woman31. Whilst Richards 
would be acquitted of such an act32, the event would continue to mar his reputation within 
Wales and thus his credibility as the leader of the Conservative Party in Wales. The third 
event would be a political decision on the appointment of David Davies as his successor as 
party leader in Wales. Whilst the more moderate members of the party could barely 
stomach a unionist leader, the attempted appointment of David Davies by Richards as his 
replacement, himself also a staunch unionist led to the party rejecting Richards’ choice. The 
moderates had been gifted with the opportunity of removing a unionist and so they were 
not prepared to waste the opportunity by receiving another strong unionist as head of the 
party in Wales. With this rejection as a clear vote of no-confidence, Richards’ position as not 
only the leader of the party but as a member became untenable. Thus Richards would stand 
down as leader of the party and eventually as a politician in general practice.33 Whilst this 
series of events were rather unfortunate for Richards, in hindsight this allowed the 
moderate wing of the Welsh Conservatives to gain greater influence in terms of policy in 
Wales. Nick Bourne, the runner-up in the leadership contest would become the new leader 
of the party34 which would allow for an atmosphere of moderation that would allow the 
establishment of a stable possibility for working with devolution. 
 
 
                                                          
31
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London and Cardiff  
With a newly-born devolved political institution, the independence and effectiveness of it 
are put into question. Without the benefit of experience, the actual facts how such a 
relationship would play out were unknown. At the foundation of the Assembly, the Labour 
Party under the leadership of Tony Blair enjoyed a sizeable degree of public support in the 
polls35 whilst the conservatives languished at levels of extreme unpopularity and a seeming 
lack of direction. With Labour strong in the Westminster Parliament, it would be most 
logical to assume that the ruling party would exert its influence onto its devolved 
counterpart with ease. Adding to this desire is the fact that members of the Labour party 
were the architects of devolution, thus it was in many ways their responsibility to reign in 
the assembly. Further, the dominance of Labour in Wales potentially gifted Labour in 
Westminster a realistic prospect of easily controlling policy within Wales. However these 
facts also lead to a great deal of suspicion as to the independence of the party in Wales and 
thus the independence of the institution because of the dominant scope of Labour 
membership. This provided the conservatives in Wales with an early base of criticisms of the 
state of affairs. 
 
The First Minister 
The role of the First Minister is one that is brand new in terms of the British political 
process. The Welsh secretary is the only historical ministerial position that is at least 
somewhat analogous to the new position, and even that is notably dissimilar. The existence 
                                                          
35
 The results of national political polls, 1997-2001 conducted by various polling agencies found at: 
http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/blog/historical-polls/voting-intention-1997-2001 
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of the role is the closest to a position of an independent head of government or state that 
Wales has never experienced in the post-Westphalian era36. The first minister thus holds a 
degree of power within Wales. The main importance of the position however is related to 
the fact that the First Minister is the most senior member of the Assembly. The position 
reflects and represents the Assembly in the eyes of the public and provides a personal 
foundation for relations between the devolved polity and the head of government of the 
United Kingdom, the Prime Minister. If any individual actor is most representative of the 
goals, ambitions and style of politics practiced in the Assembly then the First minister is the 
embodiment of those themes along with the presiding officer.  
Following the resignation of the man considered as the ‘architect of devolution’ and 
favourite for the position, Ron Davies,37 the first individual to take up this new position 
would be the Labour Party politician Alun Michael. For the Conservatives this decision would 
be somewhat favourable for them. The main concern regarding Alun Michael was the role 
that he played prior to becoming First Minister, as secretary of state for Wales.  Whilst 
Michael was clearly experienced in the realm of politics and the Welsh region, the fact that 
he held a position traditionally associated with central government dictation towards the 
region made the appointment somewhat suspicious. The reputation of the Welsh secretary 
role and its relationship to the Welsh office had led some to label the role as ‘London’s man 
in Wales’. Thus the appointment of Michael as First Minister could be attacked as a clear 
                                                          
36
 The peace of Westphalia, a term denoting the ratification of peace treaties signed in Osnabrück and Münster 
in 1648 is widely considered to be the first wide-spread declaration and acceptance of a modern state system 
based upon the concept of political sovereignty. 
37
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indication of the London party exerting influence and control upon the newly-devolved 
Welsh arm of the Labour Party.  
For the Conservatives, fortune would favour them through the actions of this Labour 
administration.  In the very first short debate held in the Assembly on June 8th 1999, just 
before the onset of the 1999 European Parliament elections the debate was to be 
concerned with Wales’ role in Europe due to the chronological relevancy of the date. In a 
display of political unprofessionalism, the Labour member for the Torfaen constituency 
Lynne Neagle would use the opportunity as a pedestal for launching a strong attack upon 
the European policies of both Plaid Cymru and the Conservative Party. Neagle would refuse 
to give way to other members during the proceedings leading to the Plaid Cymru leader, 
Dafydd Wigley to request to the presiding officer that the assembly could move, as in true 
Westminster practice to officially bar her from being heard. The first minister would reply 
that such a motion was not possible and thus lead to both the Plaid Cymru and Conservative 
groups leaving the assembly.38 This outcome, at the very first Assembly short debate would 
embarrass the Labour Party and by extension the first minister Alun Michael. Further then 
seeming unity of Conservative and Plaid Cymru members over this matter was something 
which showed that traditional partisanships and the rules of the political game in the 
assembly would clearly differ to those ingrained into the Westminster institution. Further a 
walk-out in the very first meeting of the assembly put questions upon the structure of the 
system and the institution as a whole. These problems would continue with the agriculture 
                                                          
38
 The confusion of practice between the old political culture of the Westminster Parliament and the new 
constitution and procedures of the Assembly would prove to be a problem for the efficient development of 
debates and the policy process in the Assembly. Concurrent with the various confusions over the new 
procedures, the exact powers of the Assembly would remain somewhat of a mystery for members until a 
system of Legislative Competency Orders was developed. 
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secretary facing a motion of censure and later the Conservatives would put forward a 
motion of no-confidence in the first minister because Michael failed to act upon the original 
motion of censure. The eventual resignation of Michael over the issue of Objective One 
funding sent a clear signal to the London branch of the Labour Party. As Morgan and 
Mungham noted: 
“The rejection of Alun Michael imparts a very clear signal to Millbank and Downing Street, 
namely that a new kind of politics is beginning to emerge in Wales, a politics no longer 
receptive to a command and control system in which the role of Welsh Labour is to 
implement decisions taken at head office. Inside the party initiative and authority are 
passing, slowly but surely, from unelected party officials to the elected Labour Group in the 
Assembly. Throughout Wales, not least in the once ultra-loyalist valleys, traditional Labour 
voters will continue to experiment at the ballot box if their unpretentious hopes and 
aspirations go unheeded. What the advent of Rhodri Morgan as First Secretary signals above 
all, perhaps, is the birth of the Assembly as a self-consciously Welsh institution as distinct 
from a branch office of a prestigious London address, be it Westminster or Whitehall, 
Millbank or Downing Street.”39 
Whilst this drama was expressed within the controlling Labour Party, this event would also 
serve as a lesson to the other parties, particularly the Conservatives. The Alun Michael affair 
showcased a debate between the parties that fell out of the control of the Westminster 
headquarters. Nick Bourne emerged as a clear leader in terms of criticism of Michael which 
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 Morgan & Mungham, Redesigning Democracy: The Making of the Welsh Assembly, 2000 
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was important as an indicator of an early step towards developing an independent 
Conservative Party in Wales40. 
Towards the end of 2000 it was became clear that the party in Wales was stable due to the 
leadership of Bourne. The Labour-led Assembly however was not a model of such stability. 
Whilst Rhodri Morgan would prove to be a more effective and popular candidate than Alun 
Michael, the need to change the status of the Assembly leadership became apparent. 
Labour only managed to win twenty-eight out of sixty seats in the Assembly. Whilst the 
party maintained the largest representation, this number was short of an overall majority. 
Thus, Labour policies in the Assembly encountered difficulties with opposition from the 
Conservatives, Plaid Cymru or the Liberal Democrats or a mixture of the three. In October of 
2000 the first coalition was announced between the Labour administration and the Liberal 
Democrats. With the increasing failures of the corporate system, the Assembly began to 
take on language, if not structure similar to that used in Westminster. The new leader of 
Plaid Cymru, Ieun Wyn Jones received the title ‘leader of the opposition’. This new state of 
affairs would prove to be comfortable for the Welsh Conservative Party as it brought the 
Assembly marginally closer in form to the familiar Westminster Parliament. As Glyn Davies, 
the Conservative member for Mid and West Wales noted during a short debate: 
“…There will be little impact on the Conservative group. We have always viewed it as our job 
to test the government, their proposals and to see what individual ministers are made of. 
                                                          
40
 Developing the party in Wales as a viable and independent arm of the Conservative Party is one goal 
however the task of also extending the recognisability of the members within the Welsh public mind-set would 
also be vital for the people to identify with these, at this time, practically unknown individuals.  
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We will carry on doing that. We will fit into these new arrangements as if they were made to 
measure for us.”41 
Unfolding before the experience of the Assembly during this period, was a sense that the 
old ways of Parliament which were so firmly rejected by the original design of the Assembly 
did not deserve the complete derisive treatment that they had garnered. Interestingly this 
more traditional formation of political partisanship was borne out of the non-traditional 
form of a coalition in government. Whilst political coalitions had existed historically in the 
United Kingdom, particularly during the early half of the twentieth century, the concept had 
become alien to British political culture after the Second World War with the rising duopoly 
of the Labour and Conservative Parties. This new acceptance of coalitions also increases the 
chances of the Conservative Party on gaining some modicum of power within the Assembly 
due to the acceptable policy of pooling membership in order to gain control. This cultural 
change thus created the somewhat realistic possibility of the Conservatvie Party holding 
power in Wales in the form of a coalition with another. 
The year 2001 would prove to be an interesting year for the Conservative Party in Wales, 
mainly because of the United Kingdom General Election of that year. In the brief history of 
the Assembly, such an election had not occurred and so the results and events leading up to 
the election would indicate the advancement of the party in both Wales and London. 
Further the relationship between the Welsh arm and the central party in London could be 
assessed through the policies and campaigning of the party during the election. The 
Conservative Party, under the leadership of William Hague failed to make any advancement 
in Wales with the repeated failure of not gaining a single parliamentary seat in Wales. 
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 Assembly Record, 19
th
 October, 2000 
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Whilst that sobering fact may have indicated and confirmed he death of the Conservative 
Party in Wales, the statistical results of the Conservative performance in Wales were nor 
particularly damning. The Conservatives received 21% of the electoral vote in Wales. Whilst 
as noted this number failed to garner the reward of a single seat, the number is typical of 
Conservative results in Wales which have traditionally been located within the 20% - 30% 
range. The election itself in terms of results would indicate the continuance of the Status 
Quo with seat numbers for all parties unchanged in Wales. This would communicate the 
continued dominance of the Labour Party in Wales in terms of parliamentary 
representation. However, whilst the results maintained a representative status quo, all of 
the parties, apart from Plaid Cymru received a drop in vote numbers. This drop is consistent 
with an overall drop in turnout for the 2001 election as compared to the previous election in 
1997. However, quite a sizeable drop was seen in Labour Party vote numbers with what 
could be explained as an apparent shift to Plaid Cymru. This indicates that devolution was 
supporting the acceptance of Plaid Cymru as a mainstream political party in Wales. For the 
Conservatives this outcome could provide new hope as it indicated a weakening of the 
Labour party in Wales and a general split between the nationalist and unionist elements of 
the political left in the polity. For the Conservative Party this would indicate an opportunity 
to capitalise upon this perceived weakening effect within Wales. However, a further 
indication of the status-quo remaining was the relative performance of the Conservatives 
within the ancient strongholds of the Conservative Party in Wales. Amongst the strongest 
performances were in the constituencies of Brecon and Radnor, Preseli Pembrokeshire and 
Clwyd West.  With concern, all of the mentioned constituencies fell into the geographical 
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and demographic homelands of ‘British Wales’ as noted by the three-wales-model42. This 
indicates that there had been little advancement in terms of appealing to voters outside of 
those areas of Wales. Above all the performance can be perceived as a stable defence of the 
Conservative position in Wales, albeit that position being somewhat weak during that 
period. The Conservatives maintained their relevancy within Welsh politics and the debate 
and they did not retreat into absolute obscurity in Wales. These events would spur 
individuals within the party to attempt to create a stronger Welsh identity for the party, so 
as to mitigate the clearly still-held perceptions of the conservatives as an ‘English party’. 
Within a few days of the election, the Conservative AM for Mid and West Wales claimed: 
“Our attitude towards he National Assembly is the key to convincing the Welsh people that 
we are totally committed to ‘sticking up for Wales’. Whether we like it or not, the National 
Assembly is here to stay and the Conservative Party’s commitment to it is the measure by 
which our commitment to Wales will be judged … Our strategy for Wales may include a 
Welsh political leader and may involve more autonomy for the Welsh Conservative Party, but 
at the heart of any strategy must lie a 100 per cent commitment to an effective Assembly.”43 
These words would echo a clear desire for the Welsh arm of the Party to in essence, devolve 
itself and to shake its old image away, as it was clearly being perceived within a negative 
light from the electors of Wales. The cautious words of Davies, the usage of the ‘may’ 
instead of the ‘will’ indicate a clear concern for the choice of words and of dealing with the 
London branch of the party. Such sentiments of devolving party autonomy would be difficult 
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for many in the party to readily accept, especially those outside of the Welsh arm. 
Opposition to the devolution of the United Kingdom was mirrored in the opposition to 
devolving the party itself. A strong unionist party is logically also strongly united in its own 
structure. Acceptance of devolving party structures would also lead to the clear indication 
that the party accepted Wales as a different polity which required a degree of autonomy so 
as to apply specialisms to the region. 
The effects of the election would continue to provide discussion for the Conservative party 
in the Assembly. David Melding AM, a notable figure in the intellectual development of the 
party began to voice his views in the Assembly. This statement would prove to be somewhat 
more extreme and less ambiguous compared to the earlier statement by Davies: 
“The party least sympathetic to evolution needs to become its most conspicuous supporter. I 
believe that we have reached the stage where the British state can only survive with 
devolution. Commentators should not rule out, therefore, the possibility that the next and 
most vital advance for devolution in Wales will be instigated by the Conservative Party. It 
has always been my view that Britain could survive either as a unitary or a quasi-federal 
state. But the present model of devolution in Wales – essentially shadowing the work of the 
Welsh Office as was – is derivative and categorically different from the legislatures 
established in Scotland and Northern Ireland. We inhabit the constitutional grey zone of 
executive devolution with powers to determine secondary legislation. As the constitutional 
expert Professor Vernon Bogdanor has observed – as a clear and distinct entity, secondary 
legislation simply does not exist. The scope for the secondary legislative powers is 
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determined by each individual Act of Parliament. Such conferred powers can range from next 
to nothing to nearly everything. It depends on the particular piece of primary legislation.”44 
The previous declaration is likely to be the first notable public communication of a new 
brand of Conservative thinking in Wales. Instead of either continuing to oppose devolution, 
in the vein of Rod Richards, or merely grudgingly accepting the new status-quo, melding 
argued for the Conservative Party to actively support devolution, and lead the process not 
simply to remain relevant but to maintain the British union. Thus a fresh approach to 
unionism was communicated by this speech and one which would indicate the direction of 
the Welsh party in thought for future years.  
The failure of the Conservatives to advance in Wales, combined with their first two years of 
experience in the Assembly brought together further debate and outpourings of statements 
regarding party structure. During this period towards the twilight of the First Assembly, the 
question of party structure appeared to take a significant hold upon the internal debates of 
the party. This would continue onwards into 2002 with ever clearer assessments of what 
ought to be done in terms of party structure ad policies. Further the weight of the debate 
within the party began to affect the positions of Welsh Conservative politicians outside of 
the Welsh Assembly. Jonathan Evans MEP and former MP for Brecon and Radnor demanded 
a degree of greater deal of autonomy for the party in Wales: 
“… further organisational changes will be required if we are to meet the challenge of making 
the Conservatives the leading force in Welsh politics. Central to this project must be the 
organisation of the way the Party is run from within Wales. Ron Davies has rightly pointed 
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out the contradiction of Labour facilitating the transfer of powers from Westminster to 
Cardiff and then not exercising parallel decision-making in respect of its own party 
organisation. 
Conservative Central Office in London appears to have adopted a somewhat ambivalent 
approach towards autonomy in the party structure in Wales and the English regions. For 
many years the party organisation was run on a regional basis with strong regional 
structures. I believe that we are now at the time when Central Office staff in Wales must 
come fully under the control and remit of the Welsh Conservative Party.”45 
This statement is even more significant than the previous ones concerning a greater deal of 
internal devolution within the party since the individual making the statement was not an 
Assembly member. Firstly this is indicative that the acceptance of the Assembly and its 
effect upon the people of Wales by politicians outside of the institution. Further the 
declaration recognises that the Assembly required greater interest on the behalf of the 
Conservative Party. As noted previously, the Conservative Party had traditionally been 
viewed by the people as Wales as an ‘English’ party. In order for the party in Wales to be 
successful, it had to firstly devolve policy-making but also to indicate that the party in Wales 
was a truly Welsh-based party that recognised the interests of the Welsh polity.  
 
The coming 2003 Welsh Assembly election and the party conferences before it would 
express varying concerns amongst the members of the party as to the hopes for the 
election. As noted, the accepted culture of coalition government within the devolved 
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institution would allow the Conservatives, even as a third party in terms of results to 
realistically hope to achieve power through it. Whilst the leader of the party in Wales would 
deny any possibility of forming a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, the head of the 
parties policy coordination in Wales, David Melding AM stated: 
“As we become more successful in opposition in Wales, the electorate will expect us to think 
more and more about joining a government as a coalition partner.”46 
This would be an insightful observation on the part of Melding and the first time an official 
statement would be released in terms of the consideration of forming a coalition by the 
party. The extra dimension of political strategy and thus complexity of required operations 
within the Assembly would be another argument for greater independence for the 
Conservatives in Wales. Another issue that the Conservatives would again have to contend 
with was the nature of the electoral system. The first Assembly election of 1999 had proven 
that the Conservatives had little hope for gaining seats through the first-past-the-post 
system in Wales. The additional member system had been the saviour of the party in Wales 
in terms of the successful election of Conservative Party members to the Welsh Assembly.  
Thus member selection within the list would be another factor to consider for the party. 
Differently to the other parties, particularly Labour and Plaid Cymru, favoured candidates 
would preferably be placed at the top of regional party lists rather than as candidates in 
FPTP constituencies due to the greater likelihood of them being elected.  
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The relationship between the Welsh Conservatives and the party in London would once 
again be tested. Traditional animosities towards devolution, especially from the London arm 
of the party would be brought out into the open in the period immediately before the 2003 
Welsh Assembly election. Welsh party leader Nick Bourne would state: 
“I am absolutely fed up with the way certain individuals are  acting … it is quite clear they 
don’t have elections this year and all this will do is detract from the fact that here in Wales I 
lead the most united and progressive group in the National Assembly. It is time the sniping in 
the party stopped. We need a bit of team work – at the moment it’s like eight people in a 
rowing boat with four people rowing in one direction and four rowing in another.”47 
A clear disconnect between the goals and aspirations of the party in Wales and that in 
London existed. Whilst the party in the Assembly had managed to oust the staunch unionist 
elements from control with the departure of Rod Richards, the party in London clearly had 
not accepted the approach applied by moderates such as Bourne and Melding. The 
statement also indicates that the central party valued Assembly elections far less than the 
General Election. Whilst this is understandable given the relatively slight degrees of power 
being contested, this uncaring approach clearly infuriated the Welsh Conservatives.  
 
There was however indications that even influential members of the older right-wing of the 
Conservative Party were beginning to come around to the idea of devolution. Lord Griffiths 
of Fforestfach in a lecture at the Instutute of Welsh Politics in Aberystwyth would discuss 
the change in his view on devolution: 
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It became clear that the Welsh Assembly would provide a more informed debate on Welsh 
issues because it would draw on a greater number of people with first-hand knowledge on 
the subject matter. It would also allow much greater time for matters such as education, 
health, agriculture and the language to be debated at a deeper level than was possible at 
Westminster. It would encourage politicians in Wales to listen, at greater length and with 
greater care to the concerns of the electorate than had hitherto been the case. It would 
mean that un-elected bodies would be more transparent and accountable because of their 
new status. Finally, I believe that the very existence of an Assembly at the heart of Welsh 
political life must strengthen the identity of Wales and its language, which in my judgement 
are important, if not critical, for the preservation of Welsh culture.”48 
Statements such as these were promising for the prospects of the party in Wales. The fact 
that a Conservative Party grandee of the thatcherite wing of the party had changed his view 
so completely on the question of devolution brought hope to the possibilities of greater 
understanding and support for devolution in the London party. Whilst Lord Griffiths is 
indeed Welsh and an element of his statement indicates a desire to actively preserve Welsh 
identity and culture, the lecture is still indicative that acceptance of the Assembly as an 
institution that was going to stay is apparent. Traditional small-government positions on 
government structure, the opposition of an extra layer between the council borough level 
and national level had been tested by the success of the Assembly. The reality of the 
Assembly experience was that local councils did not lose the power they had before the 
existence of the Assembly. Also the clear opportunities for Welsh affairs to be studied and 
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promoted to far greater degrees were beginning to permeate through the party structure 
into England. 
Conclusion to Chapter 1 
The chapter has explored the experience of the Conservative Party during the first 
Assembly. The challenges of the party have been discussed and the developments of dealing 
with those challenges have been explored. The following succinctly explains the 
developments and themes vital to understanding the Conservatives in the first Assembly.  
 Party Leadership – The struggle between the unionist and moderate factions of the 
party was expressed through the completion between Rod Richards and Nick 
Bourne.  The unpopularity of Richards within the Welsh party combined with the 
personal events regarding Richards would, to the benefit of the party in Wales lead 
to the ascendancy of Bourne as party leader. Had Richards solidified his position as 
leader, the future prospects of the party in Wales would have been far less positive 
as debate and eventual unity on the question of devolution would not have existed 
to the degree that it has under the leadership of Bourne. 
 The Role of Individuals – The party was dominated by particular individuals both 
within and outside of Wales. Understandably the national party leader played a role 
in forming Conservative policy. William Hague would provide constructive 
comments on devolution which would also be used to criticise the perceived 
hypocrisy of Labour party positions on devolution. During this period also Bourne 
instituted his own vision for the Conservative Party in Wales and members such as 
David Melding began to formulate and discuss a possible new way for the 
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Conservatives in Wales. As noted by this researcher, none of this would have been 
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Chapter 2 
2003 - 2007: The Second Assembly 
 
The 2003 Welsh Assembly election would prove to be extremely successful for the Labour 
party. The original surge that Plaid Cymru experienced during the election of the First 
Assembly seemingly waned and Labour recovered the traditional Labour strongholds seats 
of Rhondda, Llanelli and Islwyn.49  
The Conservatives, although failing to make any substantial electoral number gains in either 
the first-past-the-post or  the additional member system managed to return two more 
members leading to a total Conservative representation of eleven.50 Ultimately the election 
solidified the Welsh Conservative party position of being ultimately pro-devolution in scope 
and thus maintained the possibility of becoming future coalition partners in government at 
some point. 
The internal election of the Deputy Presiding Officer of the Assembly would also bring some 
interest from the Conservatives. The process was marked by parties largely unwilling to 
‘lose’ a member to the position. David Melding noted that he had considered standing for 
Deputy Presiding Officer however such a decision was vetoed by leader Nick Bourne. 
Ultimately the position would be occupied by the Independent John Marek. It was believed 
that a number of Labour members voted instead for the independent Marek over the 
Labour candidate Peter Law. As Law noted: 
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“It is quite extraordinary that not a single member of the Labour Group has told me they 
were voting for me. I may have got a few votes from them, but in the main it seems the 
Labour Group voted for John Marek – who only a few days ago stood against and beat the 
official party candidate in Wrexham.”51 
If anything this experience illustrated the unpopularity of the position of Deputy Presiding 
Officer due to the role essentially removing a completely active Assembly Member. This 




Shadow Ministerial Positions 
As the Assembly organically moved from a corporate structure and began to resemble a 
more traditional parliamentary one, the parties out of power declared their shadow 
appointments for the Second Assembly. A notable event for the Conservatives occurred in 
this matter whereby David Melding decided not to obtain a shadow ministerial position. 
This was due to Melding wishing to concentrate his time and efforts upon developing a case 
for a Federalised United Kingdom: 
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“I have spoken out on this but I have not been able to pursue it with any persistence. But 
there is a very coherent, centre-right argument for a federal Britain with primary law-making 
powers for the Welsh Assembly.”52 
This kind of reasoning is indicative of the new kind of Conservatism that was beginning to 
develop within the Conservative group. Whilst this argument was not accepted party policy 
or even widely considered in the Conservative Party outside of Wales it demonstrated the 
national character of the party in Wales and the new ideas that were being brought forth at 
the time. It will be noted again that very few to absolutely none of these debates and policy 
developments would have existed had Rod Richards remained party leader in Wales. 
A New National Party Leader  
After the failure of Iain Duncan Smith to provide a lasting base of support within the 
Conservative Party or to challenge the polling supremacy of Tony Blair, a new leader of the 
national party would emerge. Michael Howard, an experienced party member who served 
as a minister under both Margaret Thatcher and John Major would ascend to leadership of 
the national party. A further dimension to this development is the fact that Howard was 
Welsh, born and raised in Llanelli. Thus, interest in Wales and the Assembly itself should 
increase due to the party leaders’ personal association with Wales. This would aid against 
the concerns of Conservative AM Glyn Davies who would remark during this time that part 
of the reason the party were unpopular in Wales was due to the party focusing on the wider 
United Kingdom instead of Wales53. The unpopularity of the Conservatives in Wales was 
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clear in a statement that Michael Howard made during a visit to Wales upon becoming party 
leader:  
“If you grew up in Llanelli and you were a natural rebel interested in politics then you had to 
be a Conservative.”54 
The claim is clearly an attempt for Howard to appear to be somewhat of a political maverick 
given the context and history of the dominance of the Labour party in Llanelli. This 
statement whilst communicating that Howard is different to other Conservative leaders also 
is a truthful indicator of the severe paucity of Conservative Party support in much of Wales. 
The recognition that the image of the Conservative Party on a national level had to change 
was also echoed within the Conservative Party in Wales. As noted previously, the traditional 
strongholds of the Conservatives in Wales had been the largely anglicised and English-
speaking regions of South Wales and Pembrokeshire. Thus an act of ‘rebellion’ against the 
majority would be uniting with the Conservative party in Wales. 
In March 2004 the results of the Richard Commission were published. This project was 
commissioned under the leadership of Lord Ivor Richard to: 
“Establish an independent Commission into the powers and electoral arrangements of the 
National Assembly in order to ensure that it is able to operate in the best interests of the 
people of Wales. This review should investigate inter alia the extension of proportionality in 
the composition of the Assembly, and of the relevant competencies devolved.”55 
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The results of the commission noted many fundamental problems with the structure and 
processes of devolution. Ultimately the major concerns of the commission noted the 
asymmetric nature of devolution within the United Kingdom and the problematic structural 
arrangements of the corporate model. More relevant to the crux of this particular 
dissertation, the effects of the Conservative administration before the ascendancy of the 
Labour Party under Tony Blair noted to have contributed to the argument for devolution.  
Amongst the major effects of Conservative policy was what the commission referred to as 
the “John Redwood factor”56. The comment referring to the political gaffe that Redwood 
performed whilst pretending to sing the Welsh national anthem at a Welsh Conservative 
Party function where clearly Redwood had no idea what the words were. The event 
encapsulated the Conservatives ignorance and lack of effort in Welsh affairs before 
devolution. This sense of course would affect public perceptions of the Conservatives in 
Wales throughout the period of devolution. This very image is one which the Conservatives 
must contend with and move away from. 
2004 would also be the year of local council and European Parliament elections. In terms of 
council election results the Conservatives in Wales once again showed a degree of 
maintained strength by holding on to a number of constituencies and by also regaining 
Monmouthshire council. Whilst Monmouthshire is a heavily anglicised and thus traditionally 
a stronghold for Conservative support in Wales, the taking of the council indicated a return 
from the underperforming experienced before. Ultimately the results saw the Conservatives 
return to a healthy average based upon their past results. Whilst not a breakthrough for the 
party, a return to form would of course be welcome and would provide an extra degree of 
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morale for future electoral competitions. Through winning seven new seats in both Conwy 
and Cardiff, the party showed strong indications of being able to mount a serious challenge 
for the seats of Cardiff North and Clwyd West in the general election of 2005. Conservative 
MEP Jonathan Evans stated: 
“That, for my party is the first step towards re-establishing ourselves in Wales.”57 
Further, comments on the Richard commission continued to be expressed from the 
Conservative Party. David Melding continued to be the mouthpiece and intellect behind a 
move for the Conservative Party to actively support devolution as an idea. Melding criticised 
the party in particular for “bizarrely” embracing the approach to devolution that the Labour 
Party had taken. Melding also argued that the party policy unit ought to use the Richard 
commission findings in order to formulate a consistent model of devolution that would put 
the party at the forefront of devolution policy. This would create institutions that were “fit 
for purpose”58 Whilst at this point there was a muted response to such a proposal in the 
wider party, attacks upon such a position were not sounded either.  The role of David 
Melding as an individual in forming a progressive policy for devolution in the Conservative 
Party would continue to be widely acknowledged. Further support for the positions of 
Melding which included the institution of a fully-legislative Welsh Parliament was voiced by 
party leader Nick Bourne. At a St David’s day at Cardiff University to the Welsh Governance 
Centre Bourne presented the positions of the party based upon the findings of the Richard 
Commission. 59 Ultimately, the party supported the promotion of full-legislative powers 
although did not agree that the number of Assembly Members should be increased from 60 
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to 80.60Bourne noted that only a minority of Conservative Assembly members opposed the 
findings of the Richard Commission. Importantly a key member of the party, the shadow 
secretary of state for Wales, Bill Wiggin would actively campaign to abolish the Assembly 
citing problems with the NHS in Wales as a major reason for abolishing the institution.61 The 
existence of diametrically opposed positions within the party, especially considering that 
these views were held by the shadow secretary of state for Wales provided negative equity 
for those in the Welsh party who had already committed to the devolution process for the 
past six years. It was clear that even after six years of devolution, outside of the Welsh arm 
of the party, the idea was still rigorously opposed by the majority of members to a point 
where the relevant shadow minister would publicly declare campaigning against the 
institution. Positions such as these undermine the message that Bourne had been trying to 
convey to the Welsh electorate. If Bourne and Melding were to be successful in their goals 
for the party, they had to convince at least an influential minority in the wider party that 
their position of working with devolution was not only positive but also in the interests of 
maintaining the British union. Such public espousals against devolution would not endear 
the party to the wider Welsh public and remind them of the ‘Redwood factor’ mentioned 
previously.  
 
Such positions would also become increasingly at odds with the views of the general Welsh 
public. In February of 2005 ICM in conjunction with the BBC conducted a poll regarding the 
establishment of a Welsh parliament with full legislative power. In that 61% of respondents 
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considered increased powers as a favourable development whereas 34% were opposed to 
such a measure. 62 The majority of respondents thus supported an increase in powers for 
the Assembly. Quite what proportion of those individuals were Conservatives is not known, 
however, any position that sought to repeal the Assembly would now only be supported by 
a smaller minority of the Welsh electorate. Therefore, if the Conservatives hoped for any 
continued maintenance of their position and eventual progression in Wales, they would 
have to cement their position as a party committed to the devolution process. 
The 2005 General Election 
The election would prove to be a period of growth for the wider party, with a small but 
substantial increase of 33 MP’s.63 Whilst the party failed to win the election, the result  
continued the slow but steady re-affirmation of the party as a serious contender for 
government. Slowly, old hatreds of the party were becoming clouded through time and the 
party began to successfully distance itself from the disabling image of the past. The central 
party manifesto discussed devolution, but appeared to give greater concern and support for 
Scottish devolution as opposed to the situation in Wales: 
“Conservatives believe that the Union of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
brought benefits to all parts of our United Kingdom. We remain strongly committed to 
making a success of devolution in Scotland, so that it delivers for the Scottish people. In 
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Wales we will work with the Assembly and give the Welsh people a referendum on whether 
to keep the Assembly in its current form, increase its powers or abolish it.”64 
As a positive, the previous position of actively opposing devolution with an adherence to a 
blind, absolute and non-contextual unionism had been replaced with a neutral position that 
sought democratic accountability in decision making. However, by not actively supporting 
further steps towards full legislation, as in Scotland, the London party continued to adhere 
to the New Labour form of asymmetric devolution as David Melding had criticised. From this 
position this author senses a degree of pragmatic opposition to devolution. The 
Conservatives, seeing the success and popularity of a fully-legislated Scottish Parliament 
would understand that absolute opposition would weaken the party in Scotland even 
further. In Wales however, due to less certainty and the weaker degree of devolution, it 
would appear that the national party still considered Wales to be an area where devolution 
could eventually be repealed, if not through direct government action but through the 
ballot box of a referendum. Either way, the neutrality of the position and the support for 
democratic decision-making on the part of the people of Wales is a safe and sensible 
position. 
After the general election of 2005, Michael Howard would stand down as leader of the 
national party.65 The next leader would be David Cameron66, an individual considered to be 
a centrist in the party would be a somewhat welcome development for the party in Wales. 
Whilst Cameron had not overtly supported devolution, he nevertheless voiced concerns 
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over the process. The 2005 election had led to the successful attainment of three 
Conservative MP’s in Wales who all were considered to be at least somewhat anti-
devolution.  Thus, the division between the views of the national party and the Welsh party 
could be continued through the back-benches, if not through official policy.  
 
Further developments involving the appointment of Cameron as leader involved the new 
shadow cabinet. The unpopular shadow secretary of state, Bill Wiggin would be replaced by 
Cheryl Gillan the Member of Parliament for Chesham and Amersham67. This move indicated 
a desired change since Wiggin clearly was not a figure that instilled confidence in either the 
electorate of the Welsh Conservatives due to his staunchly anti-devolutionist position. Also, 
the Conservatives would during this period abandon their promise of a multi-option 
referendum which would include the option of abolishing the Assembly. This action would 
provide a degree of encouragement for pro-devolutionists in the Welsh party such as 
Melding. In essence this development indicated that central Conservative policy no-longer 
considered a repeal of devolution a viable policy. Thus, this was the first time that all parties 
represented in the Assembly were committed to maintaining its existence in one form or 
another. This would be seen as both a vote of confidence in the Assembly as an institution 
of government by the Conservatives and also one for the Welsh Conservative group 
operating in the Assembly. 
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Continuing this into the summer of 2006, the positions of the shadow secretary of state 
Cheryl Gillan began to appear to be lock-step with Welsh party leader Nick Bourne. The 
appointment of David Cameron as party leader appeared to have increased the degree of 
London party agreement with the Welsh group in the Assembly and ultimately trust in the 
policies that it was producing. This author identifies this development as the outcome of 
two specific factors: 
 David Cameron – The centrist position of Cameron on devolution and his clear 
personal ability to listen68 and trust the regional segments of his party that 
specialised in particular issues is a clear factor in the greater consistency of central 
party policy on devolution with that of the Welsh party. 
 Time – The passage of time itself allows the establishment of normalcy, traditions 
and the political trust that stems from such developments. By 2006 the Assembly 
had existed for almost seven years and the ability of the Welsh group to remain both 
relevant to the debates of the institution and to maintain their position was clear to 
the London party. Thus by this point the Welsh party had received a greater degree 
of respect and influence in terms of the perceptions of the wider Conservative party. 
This would make developing and promoting pro-devolutionist policy positions far 
easier for the party leader Bourne and the intellectual stimulus behind these 
positions, David Melding. 
Further developments of the Cameron leadership would also lead to a change of policy in 
terms of dealing with Britain’s economic problems.  Whereas post-Margaret Thatcher, 
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national party leaders had proposed and discussed greater degrees of privatisation, the 
message would shift from discussing such terms towards the language of a philosophy of 
localism.69 Also, there was a clear acknowledgement by the central party that the 
Conservatives still had a lot of work to do in order to dispel the traditional notions of the 
Conservative party being an ‘English’ party and thus anti-devolution: 
“‘…despite our fears in 1997. We freely acknowledge that devolution has not weakened 
Britain. Our task is now to use devolution imaginatively to make Britain stronger.”70 
These comments would be the greatest indication so far that the higher echelons of the 
party were ready to work with devolution in the same way that the majority of the Welsh 
group in the Assembly has. Although the work by Daniel Hannan MEP and Douglas Carswell 
MP calls for a greater role for local councils, it would appear that the Conservatives were 
instituting a modified form of ‘The Plan’ that took into account the benefits of devolution. 
 
Amongst other portions of the manifesto would be indications that the kind of federal 
model, as proposed by David Melding would be applied through promises: 
“A Welsh Conservative government would: promote the establishment of a Devolution 
Forum between the devolved Home Nations and Westminster to allow for the exchange of 
ideas between Governments in the different parts of the United Kingdom…”71 
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Continuing, the second major promise on devolution would be: 
“…establish procedures to encourage public participation in the work of the National 
Assembly and the Welsh Assembly government. Mechanisms would include a strengthened 
petitions process and the use of peoples’ juries to assist policy development…” 
This ascribes a more conciliatory approach with the public and is related to the utilisation of 
civil society72 as a means for obtaining an informed and engaged policy process. There are 
some who argue73 that this kind of approach is a form of QUANGO74 and does nothing but 
create official organisations of representation that actually detract from engagement with 
social organisations that lack funding and connections to government. 
Other promises within the manifesto would be more culturally-based. These promises 
would include: 
“Seek to establish St. David’s Day as a national holiday; introduce a Welsh symbol on car 
number plates; ensure that a separate Welsh option appears on census forms together with 
a question on the use of Welsh; petition the Queen to establish a Welsh order of chivalry.” 
These cultural promises would take on a surprisingly nationalistic tone that identified the 
Welsh Conservatives acceptance and promotion of Welsh cultural identity. Indeed these 
promises, particularly the first one appear to fall into the ‘populist’ milieu of political 
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promises. Whilst showing a support for Welsh national identity and recognition, they are 
also political promises that would appeal to voters less interested in the details of devolved 
government. It is of course easy to condemn such policies as mere fancy given that the 
Conservatives had very little chance of obtaining control of the Assembly after the election. 
However these promises are still relevant and illustrate a great shift from the cautious and 
in some cases, outright hostile treatment of both devolution and Welsh cultural nationalism 
that the party had previously operated. This manifesto is a clear indication that the pro-
devolutionist and conciliatory arm of the Welsh party held a now dominant position in the 
party leadership which, based upon previous success could only mean a positive future for 
the party in Wales. 
These developments would place the Welsh group in the Assembly in a positive position for 
performing successfully at the next national Assembly election. Whilst it was highly unlikely 
that the party would obtain major gains, the sense of pessimism and caution that coloured 
the build-up to the 2003 election for the party had been muted significantly.  
 
2007 Election for the National Assembly of Wales 
The election would prove to be a positive one for the Welsh Conservative party. The party 
would receive percentage gains of 2.5% in both first and second vote preferences.75 This 
would lead to the gain of a single AM, taking the total Conservative complement in the 
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Assembly from 12 to 13.76 This outcome would make it the second straight Assembly 
election where the Conservatives had gained new seats in the Assembly. Importantly for the 
Conservatives the election was also an event which expressed a collapse in the Labour Party 
vote in Wales. Whilst the 2003 election had been extremely successful for that party, by 
2007 under the leadership of Gordon Brown and the growing public opposition to the 
incumbent government the Labour Party in Wales would suffer. Indeed the result for the 
Labour Party, leading to a loss of four seats, one of which the Conservatives would profit 
from was the worst experienced by the party since 1918.77 This result would lead to Labour 
no-longer having an overall majority in the Assembly, thus requiring a coalition partner for 
control. This position would be filled by Plaid Cymru.  
 
The results could have been even better for the Conservatives as a number of seats were 
extremely marginal. These seats in order starting with the smallest marginal were: Labour 
AMs by 83 votes in Vale of Glamorgan, 92 in Vale of Clwyd, 511 in Delyn, 1,119 in Clwyd 
South, and 1,192 in Gower.78 All of these seats were Labour held, thus illustrating the 
absolutely weakened position that the Labour Party faced in Wales. Ultimately these results 
would further entrench Nick Bourne’s position unquestionably as the leader of the party in 
Wales. The possibility of a leadership challenge and the disruptive effects that are emitted 
from them were practically zero. 
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Conclusion to Chapter 2 
The Second Assembly would prove to be an experience of slow growth and maintenance for 
the Conservative group in the Assembly. The main notable development by the end of this 
period was the apparent change in how the national party leadership perceived the group in 
the Assembly. Whilst the ineffective leadership if Iain Duncan Smith and the distant 
approach to devolution maintained by Michael Howard failed to bring attention to the 
Welsh party, the policy goals of the Cameron leadership appeared to not only coincide with 
the Welsh leadership’s position but also erred responsibility on such matters to the Welsh 
party. Indeed a greater degree of trust in devolved affairs was placed on the shoulders of 
the Welsh arm. This came about through the personality of Cameron, a uniting and 
moderate figure with the party and also the now largely solidified and experienced Welsh 
party in the Assembly. The national party leadership was thus prepared to listen to the 
Welsh arm as the experience, positive outcomes and abilities of the Conservative AM’s 
gained respect within the wider party.  
 
The Third Assembly: 2007 - Present 
With the formation of the Labour/Plaid coalition7980, the Conservative Party would become 
the official party of opposition in the Assembly. As noted previously, the slow return to a 
Westminster-like system after the failure of the corporate structure and the reforms 
brought forward by the Government of Wales Act 2006 enabled the Conservatives to 
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compete in in a political terrain that was a slight degree more similar to that of the 
Westminster Parliament. Further, this official position as the party of opposition would 
allow the Conservatives to further enhance the relevancy of their presence in the National 
Assembly. During this time, rumours that Nick Bourne would stand down at the end of the 
Third Assembly and take a seat in the House of Lords came to the fore. The decision of 
Jonathan Morgan, a clear favourite candidate to be the next leader of the Welsh party not 
to stand for Parliamentary election and remain in the Assembly was touted as a further 
indication that Bourne would leave.81  
The major task for the Welsh group in the Assembly was the question of a devolution 
referendum for parliamentary powers as advocated by part four of the Government of 
Wales Act 2006. Whilst the party was united in the Assembly it still had to contend with 
three Welsh MP’s that were avowedly anti-devolution. This meant that the party found 
difficulties in promising a referendum on increasing powers for the Welsh Assembly as such 
a declaration could lead to an embarrassing exposition of the differences of opinion of the 
group in the Assembly and the MP’s. The party would suffer at this point for having no 
conciliatory strategy that could bridge the gap of difference between the two positions.82 
One again the theme of relevancy would play a role in at this moment. The party, although 
locked in the predicament as described above, had to play a role in the debate on increased 
powers so as to maintain their relevancy on this matter and to play a role in influencing 
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wider Assembly policy. Further the position of official opposition would generate a political 
expectation for them to play a role in it.  
 
Further developments would sour the hopes of the Welsh group as David Davies MP would 
declare that he would actively campaign for a ‘NO’ vote in a potential future referendum of 
legislative powers for the Assembly.83 The only third option for the party would be to 
support the maintenance of the status quo. However, a study on the state of devolution in 
Wales, instituted by David Cameron and overseen by Lord Wyn Roberts would argue that 
the current Assembly was not working and had failed to capture the hearts of the people of 
Wales. Further the report would recommend a large scale investigation into devolution that 
would be carried out by a future Conservative government.84 The report, although intended 
to end the debate on whether the Conservative Party should support the institution of a full 
Welsh Parliament would fail to do that and draw attention to the division in the party 
between the Assembly members and the Members of Parliament in Wales. 
 
Later on 2009, two developments would become significant for the party. The Welsh party 
conference was conducted during a time where polling responses indicated that the 
Conservative Party had a sizeable lead for the next general election and could realistically 
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win it. Also, David Melding would produce a work which explored and communicated the 
development of his thought on devolution and British federalism, Will Britain Exist in 2020? 
 
2010 would be an extremely important year for the Conservative Party. With the increasing 
unpopularity of Gordon Browns government and the polling success of the Conservatives for 
many months, the possibility of the Conservatives taking power at the 2010 election would 
be likely. As for the manifesto on devolution, a breakthrough on promises would be made: 
“We are a unionist party and we will not put the Union at risk. But we support devolution 
and are committed to making it work for all countries. We will take forward the proposals of 
the Calman Commission, grant a referendum on greater powers for the Welsh Assembly, and 
support the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland. We will rebalance the unfairness in the 
voting system for devolved issues in Parliament.”85 
Whilst this statement is guarded and does not explicitly show support for the creation of a 
Welsh Parliament, it does however finally provide an answer on whether the party 
supported a referendum on powers. Thus the party appeared to be willing to work with 
devolution at a level greater than comments issued in any previous party manifesto. The 
position has a sense of being viewed as a means of reforming the current union through 
devolution and making those ties stronger through a public sense of greater regional 
accountability and relevancy. 
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“We will not stand in the way of the referendum on further legislative powers requested by 
the Welsh Assembly. The people of Wales will decide the outcome and Conservatives will 
have a free vote. But our priority remains getting people back into work and strengthening 
the Welsh economy. So we will seek ways to work with the Welsh Assembly Government to 
increase economic growth and improve people’s quality of life.”86 
The main intention of this statement is to defer attent6ion from the question of Welsh 
devolution and note the economy of Wales as a priority before it. The most interesting and 
important policy claim in this is that the Conservatives would have a free vote. This decision 
would indicate that the party would not officially campaign either for a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. Vote on 
the matter. Thus it would allow party members to make public statements and campaign on 
either position. Whilst this would help somewhat the pro-devolution position of the Welsh 
group in the Assembly more than any previous policy on the question, the possibility of 
party members actively campaigning for a ‘No’ vote could lead to a degree of 
embarrassment for the Welsh group. Whilst Bourne would wish to create an image of a 
united party in Wales, his remit does not extend to the Welsh Members of Parliament.  
 
Ultimately, the prospects for the Welsh group in the Assembly were far superior to the 
potential position experienced by the group at the onset of devolution. The thesis will now 
move into its conclusion. 
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Conclusion 
In this work, the experiences and challenges of the Conservative party during the age of 
devolution has been explored. The first great challenge for the party was to maintain 
relevancy as it had opposed the formation of the very institution that it practiced within. 
The fact of the Conservative party being the only party that actively campaigned for a ‘No’ 
vote instantly associated the party with a staunchly anti-devolution position. Early attempts 
at maintaining a policy of absolute opposition to the Assembly failed as it became clear that 
public support for the Assembly grew and was maintained to a degree that indicated that 
the Assembly and devolution was to continue.  
David Melding 
As noted by the findings of this work, the role of particular individuals in forming 
Conservative policy in Wales in a devolution-positive direction for the party has been vital. 
David Melding stands out as a principal thinker and influencer in terms of the party position 
and approach. It is clear that his thought and approach towards devolution has garnered the 
Conservatives a lasting base in the Assembly and has more than maintained the relevancy of 
the party in the institution. 
Millbank and Cardiff 
The importance of the interplay between the National party based in London and the Welsh 
arm in Cardiff was also clear from the onset. The desire for a congruent position between 
the party in Wales and that of its’ companion in London would be great so as to provide the 
image of a united, wider Conservative Party. This desire was of course fraught with a great 
many obstacles, amongst them the disparity between the unionism of Welsh Conservative 
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MP’s and the conciliatory moderation of the majority of Welsh AM’s. Also, the difference of 
opinion on devolution and the strategies for engaging it differed and suffered from a lack of 
consistency, partly due to the relatively high turnover of party leaders within ten years. 
 
Factional Battles 
Ultimately, the pro-devolution conservative faction within the Assembly would win the 
battle of ideas and gain the influence it required with the national party by the end of the 
00’s. The role of party leader Nick Bourne and member David Melding was absolutely 
essential in firstly uniting the party under a position that at the very least worked with 
devolution without opposing it and to advocate new ideas with the aim of maintaining the 
union. Amongst these ideas would be the creation of a federalised British state as expressed 
in Will Britain Survive Beyond 2020? 87This position would be informed by an overt desire to 
maintain the British Union through a federal structure. It is the view of this researcher that 
the embracement of such a position is an essential means for its maintenance. This is 
supported by the fact of the Conservatives gaining support and maintaining relevancy in 
Assembly affairs by supporting itself at the forefront of debates on devolution and in 
distancing itself from the legacy of the national Conservative Party. Blind adherence to 
unionism and absolute opposition to change is not a productive means of remaining 
relevant, neither is it a means by which the British union can be spared. In actuality, it is 
such opposition that has fed perceptions within the Welsh electorate that the Conservative 
Party was anti-Welsh. Staunch unionism would have led to the nullification of the party in 
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Wales as any kind of serious contender and inversely loosening the bond between the 
electorate of Wales and the wider United Kingdom. This conciliatory position employed by 
the Welsh conservatives is consistent with the philosophy of Conservatism when dealing 
with change. It is a consistent expression of ideas on change expressed by Edmund Burke 
and David Hume and developed by Michael Oakeschott and Roger Scruton. 
 
For now, it appears that the Welsh group in the Assembly has won the intellectual and 
practical policy battle against the staunchly unionist elements of the wider party. This does 
not however mean that opposition has been completely undermined. Ultimately the 
Conservative Party will continue to retain elements of reactionary unionism in both its 
membership and support. Like any party it will contain older elements of reactionary 
ideological prejudice that have been ingrained into members over time.  
 
The Future 
Whilst it would be foolish to make exacting claims as to the future prospects of the party in 
Wales, it is however worth considering the possibilities. The experience of the party as 
discussed in this dissertation has indicated that the Conservative Party contains the 
adaptability and leadership that is required for the party to remain relevant within the 
Welsh sphere. The development of a Welsh arm capable of creating independent policy and 
further, engendering the trust of the central party in London has helped to enable this 
success. With the ascendancy of the party to power in the 2010 general election, the party 
has the opportunity of actively pursuing a progressive devolutionary position and proving 
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that the party leadership outside of Wales is committed to it through action and not merely 
political promises. If the party in Wales can maintain unity and if the party in London 
appears committed to Welsh devolution and thus radically different to previous 
Conservative administrations, then the prospects of the Conservatives in Wales will 
continue to be at least somewhat positive. With the nature of a Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat coalition in Westminster, the possibility of cooperation between the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in the Assembly would be something extremely 
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